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1 Introduction1
Corruption is a major social and economic pheno-
menon. Yet, to a large extent, economists have
remained reluctant to enter the debate about policy
responses, an arena dominated by businessmen,
lawyers and judges. The main reason for this coy-
ness is a lack of empirical discipline that has
allowed the study of the economics of corruption
to survive in a state of methodological liberty,
where the sole constraint on the production of con-
flicting theories is the fertile minds of the
researchers involved, Now, however, systematic
data on corruption has become available and
empirical tests are beginning to emerge. The pur-
pose of this paper is to present an overview of the
progress achieved at this stage and point out some
of the possible directions for future research.
Applied economists expect to use hard data in their
empirical work. Thus, in the case of corruption,
attempts have been made to use data on the num-
ber of convictions on corruption charges or the
number of fraud cases recorded. But this type of
legal data is of extremely low comparability across
countries, and does not capture undiscovered cor-
ruption cases. This means, effectively, that data of
this kind are more a measure of the effectiveness of
enforcement policy than of the level of corruption.
Recent empirical developments have therefore
tended to focus on subjective data created for busi-
ness-related purposes, usually for the consumption
of banks, institutional investors, or multinational
firms.2 These subjective data are usually available
in aggregated form, and can be obtained commer-
cially at quite high prices. There are both advan-
tages and disadvantages of focusing on this type of
data, but a defence on grounds of revealed prefer-
ence is sometimes used: they are the market choice
for a corruption indicator.
This article contains abridged material presented in
Ades and Di lelia (1995c). We wish to acknowledge
financial support from the Fundacion Mediterranea.
This data concentrates on what is usually considered
corruption in the Western democracies. One of the
problems with 'general' theories of corruption is that
what is considered corruption in one country constitutes
perfectly acceptable behaviour in another country For
more of this and some peculiarities in the British
privatization experience, see Appendix lin Ades and
Di Tells (1995c).
The recent empirical studies of corruption have
used data from three different sources. The first
data set comes from Business International (BI), a
subsidiary of The Economist Intelligence Unit.
The data are produced using the reports of BI's cor-
respondents based in each of the countries covered.
Data is available for the period 1980-83 and covers
close to 70 countries. The corruption measure in
this data set is quite general and ïs provided by BIs
network of correspondents who must grade on a
scale to 10 'the degree to which business transac-
tions involve corrupt payments' in each of the
countries covered. All correspondents use the same
methodology and their reports are further checked
for comparability at the regional level and at Bis
headquarters. A second data set comes from the
World Competitiveness Report (WCR), a business
publication produced by the World Economic
Forum in Switzerland, and consists of a survey of
top and middle managers in the most dynamic
firms in each of the countries covered. The surveys
include a question on corruption since 1989 (pub-
lished in 1990), include a minimum of 32 countries
and usually cover well over 1,000 executives. The
question asked is 'the degree to which improper
practices (like corruption) prevail in the public
sphere'. An advantage of the WCR over the BI data
is that it covers people with an intimate knowledge
of business practices in each of the countries cov-
ered. But the apparent lack of a centralized office to
consolidate the answers of those surveyed by the
WCR could be a drawback of the WCR data over
that of BI in a cross-sectional study, as it calls into
question the comparability of the answers between
countries. The fact that the companies to which the
survey respondents belong are successful and
internationally oriented is only a partial answer to
that concern. The third data set was gathered by
Peter Neuman and his collaborators at Impulse, a
German business publication. lt also consists of a
survey, this time of German businessmen who nor-
mally conduct business with each of the countries
covered (typically as exporters). On average, 10
people were interviewed for each country, and an
effort to have a minimum of three respondents per
country was made. An important advantage of this
data set is that there is less subjectivity involved as
respondents must simply provide an estimate of the
kickback per deal (as a percentage of the deal's
value) that would have to be paid in order to con-
duct business in each country The data was pub-
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lished in 1994 and covers 103 countries. Another
advantage is that it originates from a homogeneous
group of people (German exporters), with practical
business experience in each country covered and
who answer a quantitative question.
The structure of the article is as follows. in Section
2, we review the empirical efforts to identify the
causes of corruption using subjective indices, and
the implications of these findings for general policy-
making in corrupt environments. Section 3 analy-
ses the effects of corruption while Section 4 draws
together our conclusions.
2 The Causes of Corruption
It is useful to summarize the debate about corrup-
tion control as one where there are three main pro-
posais. The first can be named the economist's
approach and consists of diluting the value of the
control rights of bureaucrats by increasing the level
of competition in the economy. It is based on the
observation often made by economists that it is
hard to imagine corrupt activities taking place in
situations of perfect competition. The second
approach is based on raising the deterrence pro-
vided by the legal system by increasing the proba-
bility of detection, apprehension and conviction
and the penalties for malfeasant behaviour. This is
the lawyer's approach as some of its variants have
been proposed by members of the legal profession,
such as Italy's judge Antonio Di Pietro. Business
men have sometimes argued that there is a third
and easier approach to corruption control: raise the
wages of bureaucrats who have the discretion to
engage in corrupt activities. The idea is to treat
decisions in the public sphere as if they belonged to
a private company. Specifically they argue that
bureaucrats should be given similar incentives and
remunerations as their private sector equivalents.
Remunerations must be interpreted somewhat
loosely in the case of elected officials to include
votes, reputation-prestige and power-perks.
Our emphasis on recent empirical analyses using
cross-country data leads us to concentrate on the
economist's and the lawyer's approach. First, note
that competition can be introduced at the level of
the corrupt official or at the level of the firm offer-
ing bribes. The first to emphasize the effect of
bureaucratic market structure on corruption was
Rose-Ackerman (1978) when she introduced what
is sometimes called the 'principle of overlapping
jurisdictions'. Rose-Ackerman analysed the effects
of competitive pressures on a corrupt bureaucracy
dispensing a scarce benefit. In this case, competi-
tion can be introduced by allowing benefit appli-
cants to reapply in other departments if they are
asked for bribes. If the cost of reapplication is low
enough, the existence of some honest officials could
drive bribes to zero,3
Bureaucrats' actions are valuable to firms. For
example, the decision by a bureaucrat to apply a
regulation aimed at providing pollution control can
be very costly for the firms affected. These actions
will affect the firm's marginal or average costs, and
therefore have a negative impact on its profits. In
general, the value of the bureaucrat's action will
depend on the market structure of the industry to
be regulated. The lack of product market competi-
tion can not only benefit the firms in the industry,
but also potentially benefit tax inspectors, regula-
tors, suppliers and other agents with some control
rights over those firms. As competition decreases,
the value of their control rights increase, so they are
more likely to exchange them for bribes.4
In Ades and Di Tella (1995a), we examine the role
of product market competition in determining cor-
ruption. Using corruption indexes from Business
International and the World Competitiveness.
Report, we find that, controlling for the level of
development and the degree of political competi-
tion, corruption is higher in countries with
economies dominated by a small number of firms
or where domestic firms are sheltered from foreign
competition by high tariffs.5 The effect holds after
controlling for year and country fixed effects. We
also correct for the possible endogeneity of market
structure, as it might be that bureaucrats influence
market structures or erect barriers to trade in order
to later extract bribes, as in the rent-seeking litera-
ture. Using a series of instruments, we identify
Admittedly, this sort of competition involves some
duplication of costs and some implausible assumptions
about bureaucratic territoriality See also Shleifer and
Vishny (1993).
Rose-Ackerman herself stressed the need for further
research on this aspect of corruption when she stated
that 'the role of competitive pressures in preventing
corruption may be an important aspect of a strategy to
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strong effects on corruption of exogenous changes
in product market competition.
The evidence of the effect of market structure on
corruption is suggestive, though ideally we would
like to know how it interacts with more traditional
activities to control corruption. Indeed, most non-
economists may claim that more traditional meth-
ods of crime prevention should be emphasized,
such as increasing the autonomy and resources of
judges undertaking corruption investigations. In
Ades and Di Tella (1995c) we use BI data to explore
the role of legal institutions by analysing the inter-
action of openness, measured by the share of
imports in GDP, and a variable capturing the inde-
pendence of the judiciary system. We regress cor-
ruption on these two variables and their interaction,
and on a standard set of controls for the level of
development of the country and political competi-
tion. The pure effect of openness on corruption is
negative and large. Corruption is higher in coun-
tries where judicial institutions are not well devel-
oped, or are not independent of political influences.
The pure effect of the independence of the judiciary
on corruption is negative, though mild. Finally, we
find that opening up an economy to foreign trade is
particularly important in countries where judicial
institutions are not yet fully developed. In a coun-
try where the judicial system is relatively indepen-
dent (half a standard deviation above the mean) a
one standard deviation increase in openness
reduces corruption by 0.30 of a standard deviation.
In countries where judicial institutions are not well
developed (half a standard deviation below the
mean), a one standard deviation increase in open-
ness reduces corruption by 0.65 standard devia-
tions in the corruption index. Therefore, our data
show that at the margin, competition is more effec-
tive in controlling corruption in countries where the
judicial system is not well developed.
Policy conclusions follow directly from the finding
that protectionist or other polïcies directed at
deter bribery of low-level officials, but requires a broad-
based exploration of the impact of both organisation and
market structure on the incentives for corruption facing
both bureaucrats and their clients' (Rose-Ackerman
1988).
This negative effect of openness on corruption is
remarkably robust as it has been reproduced in the
three data sets.
restricting the competitive pressures faced by
domestic firms have the effect of fostering corrup-
tion. Using the example of active industrial policies
that provide tax breaks and subsidies to promote
the expansion of 'high value added' sectors or to
increase the 'competitiveness' of local industry, Ades
and Di Tella (1995b) argue that the effectiveness of
such policies will be qualified in the presence of
corruption. The theoretical argument is that active
industrial policy transfers rents to favoured firms.
Bureaucrats with control rights over those firms can
create mechanisms to extract some of those rents
through bribes. Since corruption is known to have
a negative effect on investment and growth, the
total effect of industrial policy on investment can be
decomposed into two effects: a positive direct effect
and a negative indirect effect through corruption.
Using data constructed in the context of studies
advocating the use of active industrial policies, we
find that the magnitude of the qualification is quite
high. About half of the direct efforts of industrial
policy on investment and the number of people
doing R&D is lost through corruption-induced
distortions.
3 The Costs of Corruption
One of the reasons often cited for the relative
neglect of corruption as a research topic in eco-
nomics is that a bribe is simply a transfer and there-
fore entails no serious welfare losses. Myrdal
(1968) seriously questioned this view arguing that
if corruption is allowed, government officials will
have an interest in generating bureaucratic hurdles
to demand bribes.6 Thus, rather than supporting
production, the bureaucracy becomes a burden
obstructing efficiency7
If delays are the product of pre-existing rules, how-
ever, then corruption may serve a useful purpose.
This is the approach taken by Leff (1964) and
others who argue that corruption improves social
welfare, both because it is a way to avoid cumber-
some regulations and because it is a system of
building in rewards for badly paid bureaucrats.
These two approaches, corruption as 'sand' and
corruption as 'oil' in the machine, coexisted with
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ingenious rationales for each approach being con-
stantly added to the list. But the lack of data pre-
vented these competing hypotheses from being
directly tested against one another.
Mauro (1995) presents the first systematic empiri-
cal analysis of the effects of corruption by focusing
on the relationship between investment and cor-
ruption. Mauro uses the BI index of corruption to
estimate the effects of corruption on the average
ratio of total and private investment to GDP for the
period between 1960 and 1985 for a cross-section
of 67 countries. He finds that corruption lowers
investment, thereby reducing growth. The negative
association between corruption and investment, as
well as growth, is significant, both in a statistical
and in an economic sense. For example, he finds
that if Bangladesh were to improve the integrity and
efficiency of its bureaucracy to the level of that of
Uruguay (this corresponds to a one standard devia-
tion improvement in the index), its investment rate
should rise by almost 5 percentage points and its
yearly GDP growth rate would rise by over half a
percentage point. The magnitude of the estimated
effects is somewhat larger when instrumental vari-
ables are used. Mauro also constructs a 'bureau-
cratic efficiency index' as the arithmetic average of
three BI indexes: those of 'efficiency of the legal sys-
tem and the judiciary', an index for the amount of
'bureaucracy and red tape', and the BI 'Corruption'
index. The composite index is again negatively and
significantly associated with investment.
Furthermore, the effects are quite strong. A one
standard deviation improvement in bureaucratic
efficiency is associated with an increase in the
investment rate by 4.75 per cent of GDP.
The results of Mauro's work are supportive, there-
fore, of the claim that corruption has a negative
impact on investment, and through that channel it
negatively affects growth. It is still worth consider-
ing whether the effects of corruption are different
depending on the level of red tape in the economy,
as argued by Leff and his followers. Mauro provides
some evidence against Leff by dividing his sample
into high red tape and low red tape sub-samples,
and finds a negative and significant association
See also Chapter 5 in Rose-Ackerman (1978). The Santhanam Committee report on corruption in
India (cited by Myrdal) notes that '(w)e have no doubt
that quite often delay is deliberately contrived so as to
obtain some kind of illicit gratification'.
between investment and corruption regardless of
the level of red tape. However, he finds that the
negative impact is smaller in the high red tape sam-
ple, though he makes no attempt to test whether
this difference is significant. When we reproduced
these results under a marginally different specifica-
tion, the cross-effect between corruption and
bureaucracy is statistically weak, though the coeffi-
cient has the sign predicted by Leff and his follow-
ers, suggesting that in countries with high levels of
red tape, corruption has less damaging effects on
investment.
Corruption may, however, affect growth through
channels other than investment. Mauro (1994)
estimates the effects of corruption on the composi-
tion of government expenditure. This approach
consists of examining in more detail some of the
possible channels through which corruption affects
economic performance, the allocation of govern-
ment spending being one of them. For a cross-
section of countries, Mauro finds that corruption
and political instability are negatively and signifi-
cantly correlated with the share of government
expenditure on education in total spending and in
GDP As a possible explanation, he conjectures that
it may be more difficult to collect bribes on educa-
tion projects than on other components of govern-
ment expenditure. These are preliminary efforts,
however, as one would want to make sure that this
is not merely capturing the effect of the level of
development in the composition of government
expenditure.
However, there is already suggestive evidence to
indicate that corruption is mostly 'sand in the
machine', and any positive effect in countries with
high red tape does not receive strong support from
the data.
4 Conclusion
The availability of subjective data on corruption has
finally provided the field of the economics of cor-
ruption with the empirical discipline that is essen-
tial to turn its fertile theorizing into policy
recommendations. In this survey, we review the
recent empirical contributions organized into two
broad themes: theories of the causes and theories of
the effects of corruption. The new empirical
approach has helped to shed light on a controversy
lo
regarding the effects of corruption on investment
and growth that has been running since the 1960s.
Though the results obtained so far should be treated
with caution, the data suggests that there is a nega-
tive effect of corruption on investment, and that this
effect is less severe in countries with particularly
obtrusive bureaucracies, though this difference with
low red-tape countries is only mildly significant.
The evidence also suggests that corruption is asso-
ciated with the lack of competition in the product
market and with weaker/less independent judicial
systems. The evidence suggests that both tighter
enforcement of laws and increases in product
market competition have negative and significant
effects on a country's level of corruption. But, more
significantly, the interaction term is positive, indi-
cating that opening up the economy to foreign
trade is particularly important in countries where
legal and economic institutions are not yet fully
developed.
Though the recent empirical contributions repre-
sent a major step forward in establishing the field of
corruption for progressive research, much work
remains to be done. Progress will be constrained by
data availability, and our guess is that data improve-
ments will come on two fronts. First, cross-country
data from risk analysts is now available for a rea-
sonably long time series (almost 16 years), though
at quite high commercial rates. Second, cross-
industry studies of corruption based on the work of
large accounting firms would finally allow research
to begin on the micro-foundations of corruption.
With this data at hand, future research could tackle
questions such as what are the effects of corruption?
What are the causes of corruption? What is its rela-
tionship with variables such as growth, inequality,
political competition, inflation or product market
competition? What are the mechanisms involved?
Which industries and which professions are more
prone to corruption? Does corruption distort spe-
cialization in trade? Is corruption pro-cyclical? If
corrupt payments are tax deductible, who ends up
paying for corruption? What are the true effects of
anti-corruption laws, such as the US Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977?
See following page for references.
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